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COMMENTS
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE DISFAVORED
DRIVER UNDER THE RIGHT OF WAY STATUTE
JOHN HUSTON
The automobile collision at intersections of two streets, neither of
which is arterial, is perhaps one of the most common subjects of
litigation. For the past tvienty-three years such litigation has been
governed in part by the statute entitled "Look out approaching inter-
section-Vehicles to right,"' which provides ag follows: "It shall be
the duty of every operator of any vehicle on approaching public high-
way intersections to look out for and give way to-vehicles on their [sic]
right, simultaneously approaching a given point within the intersection,
and whether such vehicle first reach and enter the intersection or not:
Provided, This section shall not apply to operators on arterial public
highways." This enactment is the statutory basis of the doctrine which
is commonly termed the "Favored Driver Rule." This "rule" gives the
motorist on the right the right of way over another entering the same
1 REM. REV. STAT. § 6360-88 [P.P.C. § 295-27].
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intersection to the left of the first. It is the purpose of this comment to
ascertain the limits to which the court will extend this right in barring
recovery against this favored driver in actions commenced by the
driver on the left with whom the former collides in a nonarterial inter-
section.
In order to place the statute in its proper historical light, it seems
well here to summarize the leading article on this subject which ap-
peared in this Review in 1934.2
The priority rule was, for all practical purposes, the basic law
applicable to nonarterial collisions prior to 1927.' Its application
meant, in effect, that the first motorist to enter the intersection was the
holder of the right of way, and the other motorist was obliged to yield
to him. The first right of way statute was construed to give the driver
on the right the right of way if the approach were simultaneous, which
amounted to saying that it was inapplicable to cases in which the two
vehicles did not enter the intersection at the same moment. In the light
of the cases, this event is a rarity, and the net effect of the holding was
to award the right of way in practically all cases to the person who
won the race to the intersection. Although this rule may have been
satisfactory when cars were few and traffic sparse, it became quite
unsatisfactory as the number of vehicles on Washington highways
increased, since it was clear that the enforcement of the rule placed
the courts in the position of virtually encouraging reckless speed at
nonarterial intersections.
In order to counteract what was considered an unhealthy condition,
the Legislature, in 1927, passed the second right of way statute4 which
is practically identical to the statute presently in force. Scarcely three
years later, however, it appeared that the problem of simultaneous
approach, which had moved the Supreme Court to scuttle the original
right of way statute, would emasculate its successor. In Garrett v.
Byerly, the court said: "... . vehicles are not simultaneously approach-
ing a given point within the meaning of the statute when one or the
other is being driven in violation of statutory regulations." 6 At this
juncture, it seemed that the speeding driver, approaching from the
2 Fitzgerald, Right of Way at Highway Intersections in Washington, 9 WAsH. L.
REV. 19 (1934).
8 As Mr. Fitzgerald points out, the 1921 statute, Wash. Laws 1921, p. 272, § 28,
s.s. 6, was in existence, but closely limited. Op. cit. supra, note 2.
4 REds. REv. STAT. § 6362-41, s.s. 14.
5 155 Wash. 572, 284 Pac. 343 (1930).
6 Id. at 361, 284 Pac. at 346.
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right, was again beyond the pale of the statute, contrary to the decision
(a year before) in McHugh v. Mason' that the collision was conclusive
of the fact that the approach was "simultaneous" within the statute,
and that it was a question for the jury whether the disfavored driver,
having looked out for, but not having seen, the speeding favored driver,
acted reasonably in entering the intersection. In an effort to negate
what appeared to be a substantial repudiation of its previous cases
under the new statute, the Supreme Court set down in Martin v.
Hadenfeldts the standard by which future cases should be decided. In
this case, P, the disfavored driver looked to his right from a proper
place and saw D, the favored driver, approaching from his right at a
downtown intersection. Because of the fact that he observed D head-on,
he did not accurately judge his speed, which was "excessive," and
proceeded into the intersection where D struck him. Said Mr. Justice
Tolman, in deciding the case, "This provision [citing the statute] is
only a part of the rules of the road, and the various other statutory
elements must, so far as applicable, be read into it, and by doing so,
it seems to us that an instruction upon the subject should embody all
of the following elements: (1) All rights of way are relative, and the
duty to avoid accident or collisions at street intersections rests upon
both drivers; (2) The primary duty of avoiding such accidents rests
upon the driver on the left, which duty he must perform with reason-
able regard to the maintenance of a fair margin of safety at all times;
(3) If two cars collide within the intersection, then they were simul-
taneously approaching a given point within the intersection, within
the meaning of the statute, unless . . . (4) The driver on the left as-
sumes and meets the burden of producing evidence which will carry
to the jury the question of fact as to whether or no the favored driver
on the right so wrongfully, negligently, or unlawfully operated his car
as would deceive a reasonably prudent driver on the left and warrant
him in going forward upon the assumption that he had the right to
proceed." 9 This is the foundation upon which the disfavored driver
cases rest. One should note, in passing, that although the usual situa-
tion in which this doctrine is applied is that in which the parties collide
upon entering the nonarterial intersection at right angles to one an-
other, the doctrine of the Hadenfeldt case has been applied to the left-
7 154 Wash. 572, 283 Pac. 184 (1929).
8 157 Wash. 563, 289 Pac. 533 (1930).
9 Id. at 567, 289 Pac. at 535.
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turn,10 "U"-turn,11 and arterial intersection cases, 2 together with the
situation wherein a pedestrian, having been struck by one of the
vehicles careening from the point of impact, sues both favored and
disfavored drivers." Moreover, since the Hadenfelt case sets out the
duties of both parties, it is generally used as a basis of decision when
the favored driver brings the action. 4 However, these cases are men-
tioned herein mainly to demonstrate the attitude of the court towards
the other motorist.
As often occurs when a large number of cases are decided in accord-
ance with rules set down in a landmark opinion, the litigation falling
under the Hadenfeldt rule tends to cluster around a number of prob-
lems implicit in the leading case. Perhaps the most important of these
are four: (1) the meaning of the fourth rule in the opinion-when is
the disfavored driver "deceived"? (2) the effect of obstructions to his
view upon the duty of the disfavored driver; (3) the determination of
the point at which the driver on the left must first turn his attention to
traffic on his right; (4) the meaning of the term "give way to vehicles
on their right" as found in the statute.
THrE "DECEIT" EXCEPTION
Upon the decision of Martin v. Hadenfeldt, the rules contained
therein were generally employed by the superior courts. Hence, the
meaning of the fourth rule-which came to be called the "deceit" ex-
ception-and just what fact-patterns justified its use by the trial court
in the particular case, became matters of importance. In the Haden-
feldt case itself, the disfavored driver convinced the court that his
failure to judge the defendant's excessive speed accurately was not
10 McIntyre v. Erickson, 168 Wash. 355, 12 P. (2d) 399 (1930) ; Sather v. Blod-
gett, 169 Wash. 25, 13 P. (2d) 60 (1932) ; Levine v. Owen Lumber Co., 196 Wash. 673,
84 P. (2d) 353 (1938) ; Shultes v. Halpin, 33 Wn. (2d) 294, 205 P. (2d) 1201 (1949).
11 Vance v. McCleary, 168 Wash. 296, 11 P. (2d) 823 (1932).
12 Brum v. Hammermeister, 169 Wash. 659, 14 P. (2d) 700 (1932) ; Weinkert v.
Daniels, 178 Wash. 416, 35 P. (2d) 22 (1934) ; Finical v. McDonald, 185 Wash. 121,
52 P. (2d) 1250 (1936) ; Hefner v. Patee, 1 Wn. (2d) 607, 96 P. (2d) 583 (1939) ;
Hauswirth v. Pom-Arleau, 11 Wn. (2d) 354, 119 P. (2d) 674 (1941); Gavin v.
Everton, 19 Wn. (2d) 785, 144 P. (2d) 735 (1944).
13 Young v. Smith, 166 Wash. 411, 7 P. (2d) 1 (1932).
14 Stokoe v. Paulson, 168 Wash. 1, 10 P. (2d) 247 (1932) ; Harry v. Beatty, 177
Wash. 153, 31 P. (2d) 97 (1934) ; Weinkert v. Daniels, 178 Wash. 416, 35 P. (2d)
22 (1934) ; Perren v. Press, 196 Wash. 14, 81 P. (2d) 867 (1938) ; Bowen v. Odland,
200 Wash. 257, 93 P. (2d) 366 (1939); Warner v. Keebler, 200 Wash. 612, 94 P.(2d) 175 (1939); Hughes v. Wallace, 6 Wn. (2d) 396, 107 P. (2d) 910 (1940);
McLean v. Continental Baking Co., 9 Wn. (2d) 176, 114 P. (2d) 159 (1941) ; White
v. Fenner, 16 Wn. (2d) 226, 133 P. (2d) 270 (1943) ; Cramer v. -Bock, 21 Wn. (2d)
13, 149 P. (2d) 525 (1944); Beiler v. Wolff. 23 Wn. (2d) 368, 161 P. (2d) 145
(1945).
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due to his own carelessness, but to the fact that he had observed the
defendant's onrushing automobile practically head-on, from which
view a reasonable person might well conclude that an automobile was
traveling a good deal slower than it actually was. In a parallel case15
decided a year later it was indicated that it would not be held that
there was not a "reasonable margin of safety" where there was nothing
to indicate to the disfavored plaintiff that the favored motorist was
driving at an unlawful speed. The court observed that the plaintiff
was not contributorily negligent for the same reasons that exculpated
the plaintiff in the principal case. It should be observed that in the
Hadenjeldt case, the "deceit" was purely a matter of speed, and speed
alone carried to the jury the "question of fact as to whether or no the
favored driver on the right so wrongfully, negligently, or unlawfully
operated his car as would deceive" the plaintiff in this case, "and war-
rant him in going forward upon the assumption that he had the right
to proceed."'" Whether there may be factors other than speed which
will elicit from the court a pronouncement of "deceit" seems an open
question. The 1932 decision of Thompson v. Fiorito7 suggested an
affirmative answer to that query. In that case the defendant favored
driver operated his heavily laden truck at a high rate of speed, and
there was evidence that he was increasing his speed as he approached
the crossing, due to his driving with the clutch disengaged. But it
should be noted that the case apparently turned on speed alone. Said
the court: "It is clear from the evidence that the accident would not
have occurred if the truck had not been grossly exceeding the speed
limit. It is equally clear, and the jury was justified in so finding, that
the [disfavored] driver could easily and readily have been deceived as
to the speed at which the truck was traveling down the hill approaching
the intersection." There seem to be no square holdings which indicate
that the reference to wrongful, negligent, or unlawful operation of a
motor vehicle means any more today than it did when the Hadenfeldt
case was decided.
In the handling of these cases, the court has not lost sight of the fact
that it has laid down four conditions which must be met by the dis-
favored plaintiff in order to qualify under the "deceit" exception:
First, the plaintiff must look for the disfavored driver; second, he must
15 Martin v. Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co., 162 Wash. 150, 297
Pac. 1098 (1931).
16 See notes 8 and 9 supra.
17 167 Wash. 495, 9 P. (2d) 789, 12 P. (2d) 1119 (1932).
18 Id. at 503, 9 P. (2d) at 792.
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see him; third, he must not engage in a race with him; and fourth, he
must be mislead into an assumption concerning the operation of the
other car which is in fact false.
As to the first condition, it is manifest that the driver who does not
look to his right is not exercising even the slightest care. Strouse v.
Smith9 is such a case, and there the court held the disfavored driver
contributorily negligent as a matter of law for his failure to turn his
attention to the right. Where the disfavored driver claims to have
looked, but in light of the evidence his failure to see the approaching
favored driver can be explained only by rejecting that claim as false,
the result is the same. In Hoenig v. Kohl, 0 the plaintiff appealed from
a judgment n.o.v. awarded the defendant in spite of such a claim. Said
Mr. Justice Tolman in affirming the trial court, "If the appellant
looked, as it is said he did, then he saw, or was charged with the duty
of seeing, the approaching car, and was bound in law to know that its
rights in the intersection were superior to his own. Being the disfavored
driver, it was incumbent on him to yield the right of way unless the
situation was such as to clearly indicate that he could cross with a fair
margin of safety.... No reasonable mind would believe the appellant
exercised that care which the law required of him."'" And if it be
necessary further to prove the-existence of the second condition-that
the disfavored driver see the favored driver-it may be submitted that
Hauswirth v. Pom-Arleau"2 supplies that proof. Here, the opinion of
the majority stated: "The exception noted in [the Hadenfeldt] case,
with respect to a situation where the disfavored driver is 'deceived' by
the wrongful operation of the favored driver, has no application here,
for the reason that, in this case, Richard Hauswirth never saw the
Pom-Arleau car at all; he therefore could not have been deceived by
its wrongful operation. The exception referred to in the Hadenfeldt
case presupposes a situation where the disfavored driver sees or has
the opportunity of observing the favored vehicle and is deceived by the
actions of the driver of that vehicle." 3 Note that this reasoning also
excludes from the "deceit" exception that class of drivers whose failure
19 166 Wash. 643,8 P. (2d) 411 (1932).
2D 182 Wash. 248, 46 P. (2d) 728 (1935).
21 Id. at 248, 46 P. (2d) at 729. Accord, Department of Labor and Industries v.
Hickel, 1 Wn. (2d) 475, 96 P. (2d) 577 (1939). Cf. Roberts v. Leahy, 135 Wash.
Dec. 613, 214 P. (2d) 673 (1950).
22 11 Wn. (2d) 354, 119 P. (2d) 674 (1941).
23 Id. at 371, 119 P. (2d) at 683.
WrASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
to see the approaching favored driver is due to the latter's distance
away, a curve in the street, or weather conditions.24
The third condition may be aptly illustrated by Roed v. Washington
Laundry Co.,2 wherein the court declined to regard as "deceived" a
disfavored driver who speeded up to avoid the favored driver, and thus
was, according to the opinion, engaged in a race for the crossing.26 It
seems reasonable to assume that in order to prevail this condition must
be met by the driver on the left, since the situation is the one which
both the first and second right of way statutes were designed to avoid.
Finally, it would seem that the disfavored driver must show that the
assumption he made concerning the operation of the other vehicle was
in fact untrue. This rule will obtain whether the "deceit" be attribu-
table to the speed or abnormal operation of the other auto. If he judges
the speed of the approaching favored driver accurately, even though
it is excessive, he is not "deceived.1 27 So also if it is clear to him that
if he does not yield the right of way he will be struck, he cannot recover
because the favored driver failed to avoid the collision, even though
he may have some reason to assume the favored driver should have
stopped.
The Supreme Court has endeavored to limit the "deceit" exception
in recent years. In 193929 it claimed to have "clearly demonstrated in
two recent decisions ° . . . that application of the exception or limita-
tion [paragraph (4)] of the Hadenfeldt rule must be confined to fact
situations which closely resemble those which obtained in the Haden-
jeldt case." Nonetheless, the "deceit" exception is still vigorous, given
the proper environment. In the latest pronouncement of the Washing-
ton court in a favored driver controversy, 1 the driver on the right won
a new trial on grounds of improper instructions. Said the court: "If the
disfavored driver was, or should have been, aware of the factor or
24 See Vercruysse v. Cascade Laundry Co., 193 Wash. 184, 74 P. (2) 920 (1938).
25 160 Wash. 166, 294 Pac. 1023 (1931).
26 Said the court, "Respondent's truck was on the right and had the right of way;
it was appellant's duty to look out for it and give it the right of way. In accelerating
his own speed in an attempt to beat the truck across the intersection, appellant was
himself guilty of such negligence as precludes any recovery of damages on his part.
We find nothing in the testimony which brings this case within the fourth of the rules
laid down in the case of Martin v. Hadenfeldt . . ." Id. at 169, 294 Pac. at 1024.
Accord, Emanuel v. Wise, 11 Wn. (2d) 198, 118 P. (2d) 969 (1941).
27 Plenderlieth v. McGuire, 27 Wn. (2d) 841, 180 P. (2d) 808 (1947).
28 Sather v. Blodgett, 169 Wash. 25, 13 P. (2d) 60 (1932).
29 In the opinion of Jamieson v. Taylor, 1 Wn. (2d) 217, 227, 95 P. (2d) 791, 796
(1939).
30 Here the court is referring to its decisions in Bowen v. Odland, 200 Wash. 257,
93 P.(2d) 366 (1939), and Delsman v. Bertotti, 200 Wash. 380, 93 P.(2d) 366 (1939).31 Pasero v. Tacoma Transit Co., 135 Wash. Dec. 90, 211 P.(2d) 160 (1949).
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factors which cause deception, then he cannot be heard to say that he
was deceived, as such would not be the fact.1
32
THE OBSTRUCTION CASES
As already mentioned, a showing of the failure of the disfavored
driver to look out for vehicles approaching from his right has almost
uniformly resulted in the court's refusal to apply the "deceit" excep-
tion.3 In those cases in which the motorist's view of the street on his
right is obscured by some physical obstruction which conceals the
approach of the (generally) speeding favored driver, the result has
been, until 1950, quite the same. In its first pronouncement on the
matter,3" the court made it clear that failure to observe the favored
driver's speeding automobile was not excused by the fact that plaintiff's
view was obstructed by the side-curtains on his touring-car-"an
obstruction," concluded the author of the opinion, "which he himself
had arranged."3 5 Again and again where the facts disclosed that the
disfavored driver's view was obstructed by such things as houses,"
buildings,3 7 trees,8 shrubbery," hedges," brush,4 walls,"3 parked auto-
mobiles, 3 and vehicles waiting in the intersection to turn," it has been
82 Id. at 94, 211 P.(2d) at 163.
BaBut cf. Vercruysse v. Cascade Laundry Co., 193 Wash. 184, 74 P.(2d) 920
(1938). There the disfavored driver was unable to see the favored driver because of a
snowstorm. The court used an interesting method in affirming judgment for the driver
on the left. Citing four cases, two of which follow Martin v. Hadenfeldt, they rejected
the doctrine upon which they rested the Hoenig case, s'upra, note 20, which doctrine is
itself a bar to the application of the "deceit" exception. Thus, by showing that there
was no failure of one of the "conditions" precedent to recovery on that doctrine, the
court seems to have applied rule (4) of Martin v. Hadenfeldt without so much as
citing the case, despite the fact that P did not see D disfavored driver prior to the
moment of impact.3 4 Rhodes v. Johnson, 163 Wash. 54, 299 Pac. 976 (1931).
35 Id. at 56, 299 Pac. at 977. Here the court is referring to the contention of re-
spondent that "He had a closed car and the vision through the windshield of a closed
car is necessarily restricted."
36 Beiler v. Wolff, 23 Wn. (2d) 368, 161 P. (2d) 145 (1945) ; Department of Labor
and Industries v. Hiclde, 1 Wn. (2d) 475, 96 P. (2d) 577 (1949).
37 Langer v. Auto Interurban Co., 28 Wn. (2d) 343, 183 P. (2d) 188 (1947).
38 Department of Labor and Industries v. Hickle, supra, note 36; McClellan v.
Great Western Fuel Co., 32 Wn. (2d) 202, 201 P. (2d) 221 (1948).
30 Murphy v. Hunziker, 164 Wash. 40, 2 P. (2d) 270 (1931) ; Fisher v. Hemrich
Brewing Co., 183 Wash. 489, 49 P. (2d) 1 (1935) ; Beiler v. Wolff, 23 Wn. (2d) 368,
161 P.(2d) 145 (1945).
40 Delsman v. Bertotti, 200 Wash. 380, 93 P. (2d) 371 (1939); Boyle v. Lewis,
30 Wn. (2d) 665, 193 P. (2d) 332 (1948).
41Winston v. Bacon, 8 Wn. (2d) 217, 111 P. (2d) 764 (1941). But see Teshirogi
v. Belanger, 167 Wash. 278, 9 P. (2d) 66 (1932).
42 Beiler v. Wolff, 23 Wn. (2d) 368, 161 P. (2d) 145 (1945); Langer v. Auto
Interurban Co., 28 Wn. (2d) 343, 183 P. (2d) 188 (1947) ; Boyle v. Lewis, 30 Wn.
(2d) 665, 193 P. (2d) 332 (1948).
43 Beiler v. Wolff, 23 Wn. (2d) 368, 161 P. (2d) 145 (1945) ; Langer v. Auto
Interurban Co., 28 Wn. (2d) 343, 183 P. (2d) 188 (1947); Boyle v. Lewis, 30 Wn.
(2d) 665, 193 P. (2d) 332 (1948).
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decided that the presence of an obstruction imposes upon the driver on
the left the duty to proceed carefully to a point at which he can gain
an unobstructed view of the street to his right, and to do any less
amounts to contributory negligence as a matter of law. In none of these
cases had the presence of an obstruction justified the plaintiff's failure
to observe the favored driver, and the first clear exception to the
normal holding did not appear until February, 1950, when Roberts v.
Leaky was decided.45 In this case, P, upon entering a downtown inter-
section at twelve to fifteen miles per hour, looked down the street to
his right, and failing to observe D's oncoming taxi, proceeded into the
intersection, where the two vehicles collided. A mound of earth, extend-
ing from curb to center line of the street to P's right, and rising to the
height of four feet, was claimed by P to have obscured the speeding
taxi from his view. In this case, the majority held: "If the disfavored
driver looks to his right from a proper place and cannot see the favored
vehicle because it is hidden by a condition in the street, he has dis-
charged his duty of using due care and is not guilty of negligence as a
matter of law in proceeding into the intersection."4 But the dissent
maintained that" "The approval of this and [McClellan v. Great
Western Fuel Co.]4 leaves this court in the peculiar position of holding
a disfavored driver guilty of contributory negligence when cars ap-
proaching to his right are hidden by trees, but innocent when they are
hidden by an earth mound." And despite the guarded language in
which the author couched the rule of decision, it might be added that
the peculiarity of the position may be enhanced by the prospect of
having to decide whether parked and double-parked automobiles49 fall
within the exception, and precisely what is to comprise the limits of
"the street."
THE POINT OF OBSERVATION
Any discussion of the obstruction cases would be incomplete with-
out including the question of the point at which the motorist on the
left must turn his attention to the traffic approaching from the favored
direction. Under the statute, drivers are obliged to "look out for and
44 Shultes v. Halpin, 33 Wn. (2d) 294, 205 P. (2d) 1201 (1949). But cf. Gavin
v. Everton, 19 Wn. (2d) 785, 144 P. (2d) 735 (1944).
45 135 Wash. Dec. 613, 214 P. (2d) 673 (1950).
46 Id. at 616, 214 P. (2d) at 675.
47 Id. at 624, 214 P. (2d) at 680.
48 32 Wn. (2d) 202, 201 P. (2d) 221 (1948).
49 Cases cited note 43 supra.
COMMENTS
give way to vehicles on their right.... ." In Strouse v. Smit," 0 the first
case to turn upon this precise point, it was held that since the plaintiff
had not looked until the front end of his auto had entered the inter-
section, he had violated the statute. The location at which the observa-
tion is to be taken is set out in Fetterman v. Levitch5 ' as some place
between the curb line, where the corner is obstructed, and a point a
variable distance back from the curb line.
That rule is applied in Plenderliett v. McGuire,2 where the court,
holding the plaintiff contributorily negligent in taking his first look to
his right when behind a safety island in the center of a complicated
Seattle intersection, said5" "We know of no case which holds that the
first look of a driver on the left may be from a point within the curb
line." No doubt the Fetterman54 rule is fairly satisfactory in dealing
with the mishap in the unobstructed intersection. However, as has been
pointed out, the cases hold that in an obstructed intersection, the
driver on the left must advance to a point at which he can obtain an
unobstructed view. In Delsman v. Bertotti for instance, the court
stated, "A perfectly clear and unobstructed view was available to [the
driver on the left] after his car advanced only a few feet from where
he took the observation upon which he relied. In failing to do so, he
was negligent."" In Beiler v. Wolff," however, the peril at which he
takes that observation may be seen. The court was following the nor-
mal rule when it observed that the parked cars which obstructed the
view of the disfavored driver "imposed on him a greater duty than if
there had been no automobiles there. He had no right to come out onto
Sullivan Street unless he had reasonable grounds *for believing that
there was a reasonable margin of safety." 8 Now, according to' the
opinion, the first point at which the disfavored driver could see for any
distance down Sullivan Street was about seven feet from the point of
impact. Although this case turned on the fact that the disfavored
5o 166 Wash. 643, 8 P (2d) 411 (1932).
517 Wn. (2d) 431, 109 P. (2d) 1064 (1941).
52 27 ,n. (2d) 841, 180 P. (2d) 808 (1947).
53 Id. at 851, 180 P. (2d) at 812. In an intersection shaped like the letter "A," the
plaintiff, proceeding from the end of the right arm, made a left turn into the cross-
arm, and collided at the intersection of the cross-arm and the left arm. Query: did he
create a risk of collision at the intersection to the left by failure to look out for
approaching traffic until he had turned on to the cross arm? It would seem that here
the rule of Fetterman v. Levitch, supra, note 51, is inapplicable.
54 Supra, note 51.
55 200 Wash. 380, 93 P. (2d) 371 (1939).
56 Id. at 390, 93 P. (2d) at 375.
5723 Wn. (2d) 368, 161 P. (2d) 145 (1945).
58 Id. at 373, 161 P. (2d) at 148.
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driver did not see what was there for him to observe, under the Hoenig
v. Kohl ruling, supra,59 it may be said to suggest that the rule will
break down in the case in which the motorist, in a sincere endeavor
to carry out the mandate of the court, moves his machine far enough
into the intersection to obtain an unobstructed view, and in so doing,
moves directly into the defendant's path. McClellan v. Great Western
Fuel Co.6" was nearly such a case. There the plaintiff emerged from
behind an obstruction to be struck by a fuel truck twenty-two feet in
length, with five of its seven feet of width on the wrong side of the
center line, and its left side a scant eight feet from the plaintiff's curb
line. There the obstruction was such that plaintiff could see the right
side of the street for some distance, and the court concluded that
"Some part of appellant's truck was there to be seen on its right side
of the street, and they cannot claim they were deceived when they did
not see the part they had a duty to see ... if they saw the part of the
truck that was in its own right-hand lane, they would have been aware
of its presence and its right to the right of way .... The respondents
are guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law."'" One won-
ders how, in a similar situation, this case could be followed, were a clear
showing made that the plaintiff was trying to follow the court's admoni-
tion in Delsman v. Bertotti, supra."
YIELDING THE RIGHT OF WAY
The McClellan63 case seems to overlook another matter. The statute
commands motorists to "give right of way to vehicles on their right."
The meaning of the phrase is set out clearly in two cases. In Geitzen-
auer v. Johnson,64 decided in 193 1, the disfavored plaintiff, in attempt-
ing to yield the right of way, finally succeeded in stopping her auto
just seventeen inches over the center line of the intersecting road. The
defendant collided with the front six inches of the halted car. There the
court held that "where the disfavored driver is attempting to surrender
the right of way, he must surrender at least the entire portion of the
street to the right of the center line-that failing to do so is a violation
of the statute and . constitutes negligence."65 Dyer v. Wallner,"6 on
59 Supra, note 20.
60 32 Wn. (2d) 202, 201 P. (2d) 221 (1948).
61 Id. at 203, 201 P. (2d) at 222.
62 Supra, note 56.
63 Supra, note 60.
64 161 Wash 444, 297 Pac. 174 (1931).
65 Id. at 448, 297 Pac. at 176.
66 189 Wash. 486, 65 P. (2d) 1281 (1937).
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the other hand, states: "The converse of this is equally true, that the
favored driver may not encroach upon the half of the street upon which
the other car may lawfully proceed or stand." 7 Were this case gener-
ally followed, it would seem that in Cramer v. Bock, 8 where the dis-
favored driver had in fact yielded all of the roadway on her side of the
center line, and Pasero v. Tacoma Transit Co.,6" where the man on the
left stopped three or four feet short of the intersection when the colli-
sion occurred, the discussion as to whether or not the "deceit" instruc-
tion should have been given are totally unnecessary, since in each of
the cases, the disfavored driver had in fact done all that the law
required of him. And again, it would be extremely difficult to justify
the McClellan'° result, supra, unless it be ascertained (as it was not in
this opinion) that the disfavored driver had in fact crossed the center
line before the truck struck him, since up to that time he had not
violated the statute.
THE BASIS OF THE DECISIONS
The system of cases which deals with the negligence of the dis-
favored driver may perhaps be explained by one of two rationaliza-
tions. The first is the mechanical approach, seemingly employed by the
court itself in the individual case. In the beginning, the Legislature
established a rule of conduct, which by strict construction could have
constituted an absolute bar to the recovery of the disfavored driver in
all cases. The state commanded the motorist at the nonarterial inter-
section to "look out for and yield right of way to" the favored driver
approaching from his right. The purpose of the statute was to prevent
collisions at such intersections. When a collision did occur, the harm
was certainly within the risk that the statute was designed to protect
against, and the violation of the statute constituted a substantial factor
contributing to the injuries which the violator sustained. Thus, he is,
under the naked statute strictly construed, guilty of a form of negli-
gence per se, which would operate to bar his recovery against the
favored motorist. At various times, other courts have enforced absolute
contributory fault in such a situation.7 However, the Washington
court was unwilling to enforce so harsh a rule in every case. It sought
to avoid it in the McHugh case, supra,7 by sending to the jury an issue
67 Id. at 491, 65 P. (2d) at 1283.
6s21 Wn. (2d) 13, 149 P. (2d) 525 (1944).
C9 135 Wash. Dec. 90, 211 P. (2d) 160 (1949).
70 McClellan v. Great Western Fuel Co., supra, note 60.
71 See Note, 89 A.L.R. 838 (1934), supplemented in 136 A.L.R. 1497 (1942).
72 McHugh v. Mason, supra, note 7.
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of negligence. It succeeded in circumventing the statute in Garrett v.
Byerly, supra,7" but went too far. The rules in Martin v. Hadenfeldt
gave the court a doctrine with which it might take a deserving case out
of the statute, by a finding of a failure of the statutory requirement of
simultaneous approach, and having taken it out of the statutory rule,
substitute a "reasonably prudent driver" standard in order to evaluate
the pre-crash conduct of the driver on the left. Thus the disfavored
plaintiff must not only prove that he is "deceived" in order to get his
case to the jury, but must thereafter prove to the satisfaction of the
jury that he acted as a "reasonably prudent driver." In the ideal case,
his proof of "deceit" coupled with a showing that there was a "fair
margin of safety" will fulfill the requirements of the "favored driver
rule." Furthermore, it seems that the disfavored driver has a right to
assume that the favored driver is operating his vehicle at a legal speed,
in absence of notice to the contrary. 4
The mechanical approach of Martin v. Hadenfeldt makes no provi-
sion, however, for those cases in which the disfavored plaintiff did not
see the car on his right until it was too late to avoid the mishap. In these
cases, the court had to choose between the rule of the Hoenig"5 case-
"if appellant looked, as it is said he did, then he saw, or was charged
with the duty of seeing, the approaching car. . ."-or some new avenue
of escape. In Hamilton v. Lesley," the court passed on a case in which
the first two rules of the Hadenfeldt case comprised the sole instruc-
tions on the rights of the parties in the intersection. There it was held
that, in absence of objections by the favored driver, such instructions
sufficed. Thereafter, although the term "margin of safety" was utilized
in connection with "deceit," its use in cases wherein the application of
the "deceit" exception was mechanically impossible77 indicated that
73 Supra, note 5.
74 See, e.g., Plenderlieth v. McGuire, 27 Wn. (2d) 841, 849, 180 P. (2d) 808, 811
(1947).
75 Observe that this rule was in force not only before the Hoenig case was decided,
but also prior to Martin v. HadenJfeldt. The case usually cited in connection with it is
Silverstein v. Adams, 134 Wash. 430, 235 Pac. 784 (1925). Hoenig v. Kohl established
its validity in relation to the Hadenfeldt rules. One should note, however, that in
Eggert v. Schumacher, 173 Wash. 119, 22 P. (2d) 52 (1933), the court appears to
allow "deceit" to be established despite the fact that the disfavored plaintiff did not
observe the advent of the favored vehicle. See the court's rationalization of the holding
in Delsman v. Bertotti, 200 Wash. 380, 390, 93 P. (2d) 371, 374 (1939).
76 174 Wash. 517, 25 P. (2d) 102 (1933).
7 Huber v. Hemrich Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 235, 62 P. (2d) 451 (1936);
Garcia v.Moran, 194 Wash. 328, 77 P. (2d) 988 (1938) ; Gibson v. Spokane United
Railways, 197 Wash. 58, 84 P. (2d) 349 (1938); Pyle v. Wilbert, 2 Wn. (2d) 429.
98 P. (2d) 664 (1940) ; Pasero v. Tacoma Transit Co., 135 Wash. Dec. 90, 211
P. (2d) 160 (1949).
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rule (2) of the Hadenfeldt case was the basis of decision. And if one is
to give weight to the flat statement of the court that it does not intend
to extend the exception indicated in rule (4) of Martin v. Hadeneldt71
the second rule assumes additional importance.
A third class of cases falls under neither classification. In each of
these cases the disfavored driver failed to see the approach of the
motorist to his right. In each of them, reference to the Hadenfeldt case
was confined to explaining that the "deceit" requirement had been
satisfied or did not exist, and the "margin of safety" reasoning was not
specifically invoked. 9 Yet even here the main line of reasoning persists
-that when the disfavored driver satisfies the requirement of reason-
able conduct, he will be allowed to recover despite the fact that he did
not comply with the mechanical requirements of the "deceit" doctrine.
"We fail to see what other precautions respondent could have taken,"
said Mr. Justice Blake in expressing the unanimous opinion of the
court sitting en bane in Bredemeyer v. Johnson."0 "He was not only
not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, but if his
evidence is to be believed [and the jury did believe it], he is free of
contributory negligence as a matter of fact."
Thus one must conclude that in assigning reasons for the holdings
where it was unwilling to find the disfavored plaintiff contributorily
negligent as a matter of law, the Washington Court has set the cases
into three categories, depending upon their facts. When the situation
warrants its application, they seem to prefer the "deceit" exception in
Martin v. Hadenfeldt, and when it is inapplicable, they apply the
"margin of safety" doctrine in preference to the finding that there was
little more that the plaintiff could do to insure his own safety. And the
78 See Jamieson v. Taylor, 1 Wn. (2d) 217, 95 P. (2d) 791 (1939).
79 In Teshirogi v. Belanger, 167 Wash. 278, 281, 9 P. (2d) 66, 67 (1932), the court
concluded: "This ...statute does not necessarily require the disfavored driver to
stop and let the driver of the vehicle on his right pass through the intersection before
the disfavored driver enters it. Neither does the law accord the favored driver the
right to collide with any vehicle in the intersection that may be on his left when the
driver of that vehicle has complied with the statute and accorded to the favored driver
ample space in which, by the exercise of reasonable care, to pass safey across the
intersection. The right of way accorded the favored driver is merely a relative right,
and must be reasonably asserted.' Fetterman v. Levitch, 7 Wn. (2d) 431, 109 P. (2d)
1064 (1941) was decided on the question of whether P, after being stopped in the
intersection by the unexpected appearance of pedestrians, acted reasonably in relying
on an observation previously made of the street to his right when he again proceeded.
There the court held it properly a jury question. Roberts v. Leahy, 135 Wash. Dec.
616, 205 P. (2d) 672 (1950) is turned on the facts and on grounds that reasonable
minds could differ as to P's contributory negligence. See also, Vercruysse v. Cascade
Laundry Co., note 33 supra.
80 179 Wash. 225, 36 P. (2d) 1062 (1934). The quotation appears at p. 227, 36
P. (2d) 1063.
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meaning of "deceit" and "margin of safety" and every other device
used to exculpate the disfavored plaintiff is: The disfavored driver
fulfilled his obligation to use reasonable care.
It is plain that the method of the court is literally to ascertain
whether the ordinary reasonable motorist in the position of the dis-
favored driver would have proceeded into the intersection when
equipped with the information such driver would have derived from the
physical situation which surrounded him. Then, if this hypothetical
conduct coincides with that of the disfavored driver, the latter's viola-
tion of the statute is justified. Complications have arisen because it has
been the practice of the Supreme Court to state categorically that in
certain of these instances the conduct of the driver on the left fell so
far below the standard that reasonable men could not but agree that
he was guilty of contributory fault."1 But it is submitted that in follow-
ing again and again these convenient statements of the policy of the
law, there has been an occasional tendency on the part of the court to
lose sight of the fact that the norm which is followed is, in the final
analysis, simply a declaration of what constitutes reasonable conduct
in the light of a given fact-pattern. 2 Moreover, so doing, it has set the
courses of lines of authority so that they seem destined to collide. In
this latter connection, for instance, the court might consider the wis-
dom of confining the favored driver to his right side of the street, thus
allowing the other motorist in any event the remaining half in which to
look to his right at the obstructed corner and bring his machine tQ a
halt. By crystallizing the center line as the limit of the portion of the
street the motorist on the left must yield, the court might accomplish
three ends: the obviation of difficulty regarding the point at which one
must look to his right at the obstructed corner before proceeding, the
attainment of a less harsh result in dealing with the favored driver on
the wrong side of the street, and the recognition of the Dyer 3-Geitzen-
auer8 4 rule as the true norm, allowing the disfavored driver to rely on
the "right-of-center" statute 5 in absence of notice to the contrary. But
81 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 285, comment g (1934).
82 At one point, the court expressed an awareness of the dangers inherent in this
practice: "We have no other rule than that it is a question of law only when it can
be said that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue. The particular facts in each
caes must control that question." Continuing that any other rule would strike out the
function of either the court or the jury, they conclude, "Neither of these positions
is sound." Gavin v. Everton, 19 Wn. (2d) 785, 789, 144 P. (2d) 735, 738 (1944).
83 Dyer v. Wallner, 189 Wash. 486, 65 P. (2d) 1281 (1937).
84 Geitzenauer v. Johnson, 161 Wash. 444, 297 Pac. 174 (1931).
85 "Whenever any person is operating any vehicle upon any public highway of this
state he shall at all times drive same to the right of the center of the highway ...
REM. REV. STAT. 6360-75 [P.P.C. 295-1].
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each rule seems to invite the exceptional case, and a case in which the
favored driver was compelled to use the center or wrong side of the
road, and the driver on the left had no notice of the fact,"8 might well
provide the suggested revision with its own first exception.
The suggested rule and the hypothetical case are submitted not only
as a possible method of temporarily averting the collision of lines of
authority, but in argument for the ultimate proposition that the court
seems to be recognizing, i.e., that the practice of laying down from time
to time, rules of negligence governing particular fact-patterns should
be abandoned in favor of a more flexible application of the standard of
ordinary care. An acknowledgment by the court that the actual theory
upon which the cases are decided is that of justification, by a showing
of reasonable conduct, of violations of the regulatory statute,8" might
well enable it to reach satisfactory results without resort to tools so
expanded and embellished by successive adaptations that they seem no
longer suitable to the task.
86 The hypothetical situation is not unlike the facts in Beiler v. Wolff, 23 Wn. (2d)
368, 161 P. (2d) 145 (1945).
87 "In the ordinary case, all that is required is reasonable diligence to obey the
statute, and it frequently has been recognized that a violation of the law is reasonable,
and may be excused. Although such cases often speak of a supposed intent and an
'implied exception' in the statute itself, they seem rather to indicate that, in the
absence of a clear declaration by the legislature, the courts reserve the final authority
to determine whether the civil standard of reasonable conduct will always require
obedience to the criminal law." PRossER, ToRTs, § 39, p. 272.
